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Abstract
When Republican legislators in Arizona failed to approve educational
vouchers in four consecutive legislative sessions, a charter school 
program was approved as a compromise. The charter school policy was
written during a special summer session and within three years, over
30,000 students were enrolled in 260 charter schools across the state.
Republican policy makers, who failed to enact voucher legislation,
proclaimed the charter school program to be an overwhelming success
and protected it from amendments by Democrats and potential actions of
bureaucrats that could have altered the policy intent. Research on the
implementation of policy indicates that state and local implementors
frequently undermine or alter legislative intentions. However, when
Arizona policy makers approved the charter school policy, they
overcame this persistent implementation phenomenon and, in fact,
succeeded in preserving the legislative intentions in the working
program. This policy study analyzes how they were able to achieve this
elusive result. Key policy makers attended to four significant features of
policy implementation in creating the charter school policy:
communication, financial resources, implementor attitudes, and 
bureaucratic structure. Manipulating these key variables allowed policy
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makers to reduce implementation slippage.
The Implementation Problem
            Contrary to the desires of federal, state, and local policy makers, policies are not
self-executing. After policy enactors develop legislation, various stages precede a
working program. Simply because legislators express explicit intentions in policy does
not guarantee those aims will be preserved through the implementation process.
Frequently, implementors misconstrue or disagree with the conceived purpose and
undermine legislative intent. 
            Beginning in the 1970s with the work of Pressman and Wildavski (1973), studies
on the implementation of government policy over the following 16 years illustrated the
problem of convincing local implementors to adhere to the spirit of government
mandates. This implementation problem has been repeatedly identified in studies of
agricultural, economic, energy, environmental, labor, penal, public health, urban
planning, technology, and welfare policies at the state and federal levels. Baum (1981;
1984) and Clune (1984) identified similar frustrations in the implementation of judicial
policy. 
            In the late 1970s, research on federal and state educational policy also identified
the implementation problem (Barro, 1978; Berman & Mclaughlin, 1978; Weatherly &
Lipsky, 1977). Over the following two decades, educational researchers have continued
to highlight the implementation problem in their work (Elmore & McLaughlin, 1981;
Hall, 1995; Hall & McGinty, 1997). In a comprehensive review of the literature Odden
(1991) concluded:
In short, early implementation research findings coupled with somewhat
later findings on the local educational change process concluded that local
response was inherently at odds with state (or federal) program initiative. If
higher levels of governments took policy initiatives, it was unlikely local
educators would implement those policies in compliance with either the
spirit, expectations, rules, regulations or program components . (p. 2) (Note
1)
Social scientists from various disciplines studying an array of social
programs acknowledge that policies emanating from higher levels of 
government are inherently problematic. McLaughlin (1998) identified local
capacity and will as two paramount variables that affect the outcomes of the
implementation process.
The local expertise, organizational routines, and resources available to
support planned change efforts generate fundamental differences in the
ability of practitioners to plan, execute, or sustain an innovative effort. The
presence of will or motivation to embrace policy objectives or strategies is
essential to generate the effort and energy necessary to a successful project .
(p.72) (Note 2) 
            Despite the preponderance of research indicating slippage during the
implementation of social policy, legislators are not completely impotent after enacting
legislation. McDonnell and Elmore (1987) identified four discrete methods policy
makers can use to increase the likelihood that policy intentions are preserved in working
programs. "They can set rules, they can conditionally transfer money, they can invest in
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future capacity, and they can grant or withdraw authority to individuals and agencies"
(p.140). Baum (1984) described two additional sources of power policy enactors hold
over policy implementors- they can investigate and publicize. "These powers allow
legislators to embarrass an agency and its officials." (p.41). What is consistent over three
decades of research in the policy implementation literature of social policy is that armed
with these "policy instruments," more often than not, policy enactors fail to manipulate
the actions of policy implementors. Current research on the implementation of education
policy is sparse and further exploration of this area is necessary. Accordingly, this study
sought to clarify the nexus between policy development and program enactment by
focusing on the implementation process. The actions of policy makers and the contextual
environment surrounding the implementation of the Arizona Charter School policy were
analyzed using a case study methodology. The purpose of this research was to
investigate three interrelated research questions concerning the design and
implementation of Arizona's charter school legislation.
How did policy makers articulate the intent of the charter school policy?1.
After three years of a working charter school program, were they satisfied with the
results?
2.
How were state policy makers able to preserve their original intentions through the
implementation process?
3.
Methodology
            A descriptive and exploratory case study approach was utilized for this policy
study because how or why questions were posed, I had little control over the events, and
the focus was on contemporary phenomenon (Yin, 1994, p.1). The study was completed
using data from the analysis of documents, observations of key actors, and focused
interviews with policy makers and policy implementors. 
            Relevant documentary information from a variety of sources, including articles
from Arizona newspapers, minutes from the Committee on Education meetings of the
state legislature, and relevant charter school statutes were analyzed. Data from
documents were used to verify and strengthen data from other sources (Stake, 1995; Yin,
1994). Key actors were observed in various contexts, including Committee on Education
meetings in the Arizona State Senate and the Arizona House of Representatives during
the 1998 legislative session. Also, observations of the meetings of the State Board of
Education and the State Board for Charter schools were completed from 1995-1998 .
(Note 3) My role in the field was toward the observer side of the participant observer
continuum (Gold, 1969). 
            The third significant source of data came from focused interviews. A
semi-structured interview protocol was employed with 24 key actors from the following
four groups:
Legislative insiders1.
Administrative staff and board members from the two state level charter school
sponsoring agencies (the State Board of Education and the State Board for Charter
Schools)
2.
Administrative staff members from the Arizona Department of Education,
including the Superintendent of Public Instruction
3.
Administrative staff members from the Office of the Auditor General4.
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            Interviews were taped and transcribed. All participants were given a chance to
comment on the content of the interview transcripts and all 24 granted permission for the
quotations used in this study. In some cases participants insisted on receiving credit for
their comments, while others preferred to remain anonymous. 
            Data collection and analysis occurred simultaneously through a process of
reduction, display, and verification (Miles & Huberman, 1994). When data from one
source was collected it was coded and compared with data collected from the same
source at another time, as well as data collected from alternative sources. As this process
continued, patterns emerged. These patterns often became themes that were refined and
challenged against data from competing sources. Eventually distinct categories
developed, and conclusions emerged. 
            This qualitative case study provides a rich account of the Arizona policy making
context, however, generalization is limited, and this single case provides us with little
insight into national trends. A multi-state comparison would be useful in such a pursuit.
Moreover, most of the data collected was based entirely on the perceptions of policy
makers and implementors. The recent nature of the reform, combined with the minimal
reporting requirements for charter schools resulted in a meager amount of quantitative
data. 
            Although this research is focused on the ways that Arizona legislators attempted
to insure their intent was carried out, the author takes no position on the question
whether this goal and these objectives are desirable in themselves. Others have pointed
out the value of "loose coupling," (Weick, 1982) "street-level bureaucracy," (Lipsky,
1980) and other ways in which legislative or regulatory intent are modified or, in
extreme situations, even subverted, for the good of all. Finally, this study does not
address whether or not this particular reform, charter schools, produces meaningful
changes in classroom practice (see Bomotti, Ginsberg & Cobb, 1999 and Knapp, 1997
for further discussion of this type of research). Unarguably an important question, it was
beyond the scope of this research.
Legislative Intent
            Across the United States many organizations, including Republicans, Democrats,
teachers unions, business organizations, and parent groups have climbed on the charter
school bandwagon. Many of the groups promote disparate ideologies, but every
organization has specific motivations for its support . (Note 4) 
            In the US, the charter school concept has been driven by three distinct ideologies.
Consequently, policy makers define the problem to be solved by charter schools
differently in various states. Some state legislators argue that the current bureaucratic
system of public education has stifled educational improvement and innovation in the
United States. Charter schools in these states typically are granted a blanket waiver from
most rules and regulations. Other state policy makers believe that market mechanisms
will improve the public school system. In these states charter schools must compete for
and maintain their student population. Finally, a few state legislators maintain that
teacher professionalism must be increased before any real improvements in public
education will occur. In these states teachers have the power to make and implement
decisions that affect learning in the classroom (Garn, 1998, p. 50). 
            This research first examined how key legislative insiders in Arizona defined the
problem and articulated the intent of their charter school policy. Determining intent does
not easily lend itself to precise measurement. However, the triangulation of various data
sources confirmed the purpose of the policy. 
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            The former Chair of the House Education Committee, Lisa Graham-Keegan,
defined the "problem" that the charter school policy was intended to solve in a 1994
article that appeared in the Arizona Republic. "I hope this reform will begin to
demonstrate that you don't need all of the bureaucratic overlay we now have in public
schools." What they [charter schools] are getting is freedom from regulations in return
for greater [market] accountability" (Mattern, 1994, p. A1). This was corroborated in the
interview data. A leading legislator in the Arizona Senate reflected on the original
intentions.
The bureaucratic administration and the monopoly that public schools used
to have are now being eroded by charter schools." Charter schools have to
compete in a market for students. So, if they for whatever reason can't
attract children to go to that school, they are not going to have a school. And
that's the whole key to charter schools; that's what disciplines them and that
is their accountability mechanism. (Senate Education Committee Member
Tom Patterson, March 16, 1998) 
Furthermore, even legislators from the minority party, who were ideologically opposed
to market accountability, recognized the aims of the charter school reform.
Well, for the rest of the world, the non-charter public schools, there is this
perception, and also laws, which say, 'If I am going to give you the money
out of the purse, then you have to give me accountability back.' So, what
happened with these [charter schools] was that by using the definition of the
'innovativeness' of charter schools, we can just give them the money and
part of the 'innovativeness' is not bothering them about the details of how
the money is being spent." So, I guess, I mean, to me there is no
[bureaucratic] accountability. (House Education Committee Member Kathy
Foster, March 24, 1998)
Well, right now, currently, there's an atmosphere in the state that the 'buyer
beware,' 'let the market forces drive them,' 'people are voting with their feet,'
any number of clichés. As far as voting with their feet or the rhetoric you
hear that charter schools are more accountable because there is an actual
contract they have to adhere to. Well, the oversight of this contract is lame
at best. The Department of Ed[ucation] and even the charter school boards
themselves, and local districts that have all chartered, there has been very
little monitoring of activities and adhering to their charter. (Senate
Education Committee member Mary Hartley, March 23, 1998)
            Arizona legislators created a charter school policy that was intended to address
two intertwined problems. First, they wanted to reduce the bureaucracy with which
public schools must contend. Second, they wanted to inject market mechanisms into the
public school system. Satisfaction with the Results Building on the first research
question, the second goal of the study was to determine if Arizona's policy makers were
satisfied with the results of the working charter school program. Data from interviews
with key actors indicated that they were pleased with the effect of the legislation.
Well, we hoped that it [charter school policy] would have a large impact
and I think it is more successful than we anticipated it would be in the time
span. Arizona is probably one of the leading states in the number of charters
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that have been granted and we have a few failures, but we expected that.
(Chair of the House Education Committee, Dan Schottle, March 25, 1998)
It's [the charter reform] been one of those things that I think we had a pretty
clear idea of what kind of principles we wanted it based on, and particularly
what kind of accountability we wanted for charter schools.... And we were
astonishingly successful, but I don't think we realized, or I certainly did not
realize all the implications of that at the time and what a large and profound
public policy movement this would be. (Senate Education Committee
Member Tom Patterson, March 16, 1998)
I am not a plan-ahead person, and I don't know what will happen in the
future, and I certainly did not know with the charter school legislation when
I was working on it. That is just not the way I work. However, I did know
there were some good principles in that legislation and then it took off....
Charter schools have just opened up one more venue for school choice.
They vastly surpassed the number of schools that I or anyone else
anticipated.... Yes, I am happy with the program, and, yes I think it is
working like I wanted it to. (Personal communication, Superintendent of
Public Instruction, Lisa Graham-Keegan, April 21, 1998)
            The interview data were confirmed by data from documentary sources. All
proposed charter school legislation from 1995-1998 was coded into three categories:
bills that reinforced the intent, measures that subverted the intent, and acts not related to
the intent . (Note 5) Moreover, the proposals were grouped by party preference.
Assuming that proponents would protect the program from bills that would alter the
policy intent, the documentary record was clear. Although many amendments (proposed
by Democrats) would have subverted the legislative intent, very few of those made it out
of the House or Senate Education Committees, and even fewer were written into law.
And those proposed by Republicans reinforced the intent and were more likely to be
written into law. 
            Legislators involved in passing the charter law in 1994, who remained in office
through 1998, explicitly understood their role in protecting the principles expressed in
the statute. Senator John Huppenthal, Chair of the Senate Education Committee stated
that "They [charter schools] are still getting sucked back into the bureaucracy." I've been
able to defeat any legislation that would harm the charter schools" (March 23, 1998).
The stability of the political support structure from 1994 to 1998 contributed to the
preservation of intentions. Champions of the charter school policy remained in powerful
positions and were able to protect the program from amendments that could potentially
subvert the aims of the policy. Senator John Huppenthal served on the Education
Committee from 1993 through 1998 and chaired the committee from 1995 through
1998. The Chair of the House Education Committee, Lisa Graham-Keegan, resigned
from the House of Representatives and soon after was elected Superintendent of Public
Instruction. Representative Dan Schottle assumed leadership of the House Education
Committee in 1995 and maintained a strong defense of charter schools. Senator Tom
Patterson was the first to introduce the idea of charter school reform to the Arizona
Legislature. Formerly the Majority Leader, his support and defense of the charter policy
was invaluable to the preservation of intentions. 
            In sum, policy enactors who enacted the statute remained in powerful positions.
These champions were pleased with the working program and worked diligently to
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protect it. With regard to the first two research questions, the data were clear. Policy
makers wanted to limit the bureaucratic requirements for charter schools and replace
them with market accountability mechanisms. Moreover, after four years of charter
school operation in the state, they were satisfied that the policy had achieved those
objectives. The final step in this policy study was to address the third and larger research
question: How were Arizona policy makers able to preserve the original legislative
intent through the implementation phase when so many mandates are subverted?
Avoiding Implementation Slippage
            To address the final research question required a framework that could isolate the
linkages between the national and state political levels, state political and state
bureaucratic levels, and state bureaucratic and charter school levels. Hall and McGinty's
(1997) mesodomain framework was useful in clarifying how "the realization of
intentions is shown as both constrained and enabled by (1) organizational context and
conventions, (2) linkages between multiple sites and phases of the policy process, (3) the
mobilization of resources, and (4) a dynamic and multifaceted conceptualization of
power" (p. 439).
The National Level
            At the national level, George W. Bush pushed hard for systemic reform of the
district public school system and was the first American president to endorse charter
schools. Charter school legislation was first approved in Minnesota during the 1991
legislative session. Since that time, the charter school reform has evolved into a national
movement as 34 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have approved this
policy. Bush's successor, William J. Clinton, recognized this national education reform
trend and called for the development of 3,000 charter schools by 2001 (Clinton, 1997).
Accordingly, federal funds for charter school research were first approved in 1994
through amendments to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. Federal stimulus
funds to charter school operators (to defray start up costs) increased from $6 million in
1995 to $100 Million in 1998 (Wohlstetter & Griffin, 1997). 
            Information about charter schools spread nationally through various channels,
but two organizations took the lead. The first issue network was the Center for School
Change at the Hubert H. Humphry Institute of Public Affairs at the University of
Minnesota (Nathan, 1996). The Pioneer Institute, a conservative think tank located in
Massachusetts, was the second organization to take an early lead in publicizing this
reform (Wohlstetter, Wenning, & Briggs, 1995).
National to State Political Linkage
            Ted Kolderie, a Senior Policy Analyst at the University of Minnesota's Hubert
Humphry Institute, visited Arizona in 1993 to explain the charter school concept.
Kolderie, who was influential in lobbying the Minnesota Legislature on the merits of
charter schools, emphasized the professionalism for teachers embodied in the reform. In
Arizona, his vision of charter schools was rejected. Providing teachers with more
autonomy was not a problem that Arizona's leading legislators wanted to fix. In addition
to disagreeing with the core ideology (as described by Kolderie), in 1993 notable policy
makers in Arizona were pondering more radical educational change--school vouchers.
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Vouchers for all children were a top education reform priority for influential Republican
members of the legislature and Arizona's Republican Governor, Fife Symington. During
the 1993 legislative session, Symington stated that he would defeat any education reform
that did not contain a voucher program. 
            Conversely, Arizona Democrats, the minority party, were fundamentally against
the concept of a voucher program. They were able to unite and, with a few moderate
Republicans, mustered enough support to defeat voucher proposals in the 1991, 1992,
and 1993 legislative sessions. By 1994, the calls for educational reform were incessant.
The public and the media were increasingly demanding that legislators "do something."
As Arizona's 1994 legislative session ended, again without voucher legislation, the
pressure intensified. 
            In the early 1990s, staff members at the Goldwater Institute, a conservative think
tank located in Phoenix, developed several alternative voucher proposals, ranging from
limited to full participation. When voucher legislation was defeated in four successive
sessions, Goldwater staff members promoted charter schools as a viable policy option.
Goldwater officials closely monitored the school choice issue networks and were aware
of the Pioneer Institute's work on charter schools. They saw the potential in the concept,
but rather than focusing on the teacher autonomy, the Goldwater Institute's proposal
emphasized radically decreasing bureaucratic oversight and forcing charter schools to
compete for students. Behind closed doors in a Republican caucus, the Goldwater
Institute's plan was modified without input from Democratic legislators. Authored by
House Education Chair Lisa Graham-Keegan and championed by leading legislators, it
quickly passed through the special session and was enacted into law on September 15,
1994. 
            Contrary to many other states, in Arizona charter school legislation was approved
as a compromise in place of vouchers. Although both Democrat and Republican
legislators voted for the bill, it is too simplistic to argue that there was bipartisan
support. Democrats were against any plan that would divert funding from the district
public schools. However, they were worried they would not have the votes to defeat
another voucher bill. Conversely, Republicans were displeased they had failed at their
original voucher intentions, but were anxious to pass an education reform that increased
parental and student choice while decreasing bureaucratic oversight.
State Political to State Bureaucratic Linkage
            The state political to state bureaucratic linkage was critical to the preservation of
policy makers' intentions. Although policy makers had clearly articulated intentions for
the charter school plan, this did not guarantee that state level bureaucrats would promote
those interests during implementation. There has been a history of discord between the
state Department of Education and state legislators; the latter feeling that bureaucrats too
frequently misinterpreted the aims of the policy and the former feeling they were
constantly being asked to do too much with too little. Due to the institutional distrust,
policy makers took two explicit steps to ensure that state level bureaucrats did not
undermine their intentions. First, the legislature minimized the authority of the
Department of Education to regulate charter schools. McDonnell and Elmore (1987)
stated that "Selecting or creating an implementation agency is often as important a
choice for policymakers as transferring money or specifying rules" (p.138). The
legislation granted two state sponsoring boards (the State Board of Education and the
newly created State Board for Charter Schools) general sponsorship and oversight
responsibilities for charter schools. This shifted the authority away from the Arizona
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Department of Education to regulate public charter schools. 
            To reinforce this shift in authority, legislators included a statute that provided the
governor with the power to appoint members to the State Board for Charter Schools.
Although Governor Symington was originally opposed to charter legislation, it was not
because he opposed increasing school choice. Rather he wanted additional choices
(including private and religious schools) and supported education vouchers. However,
he quickly reversed course and championed the charter school reform when he realized
vouchers were not a viable policy option. As a strong proponent of school choice,
Symington appointed seven individuals to the State Board for Charter Schools who
supported the legislative intent. Board members understood that they first needed to
approve as many applications as allowed under the law, and that second, they would
play a "hands off" role in oversight (Garn & Stout, in press). The members of the State
Board of Education, while supportive, were so to a lesser extent because of a slightly
more diverse board makeup . (Note 6) 
            In addition to transferring much of the authority for charter schools to the State
Sponsoring Boards, legislators used a second policy instrument to ensure state
bureaucrats would not interfere with the spirit of the legislation. They passed the charter
school reform as an unfunded mandate for state level administrative staff. The Arizona
Department of Education, the Office of the Auditor General, the State Board of
Education and the State Board for Charter Schools received no additional funding for
charter school staff. This proved to be an effective policy instrument in limiting the
influence of bureaucratic agencies. The Arizona Department of Education [ADE] and
the Office of the Auditor General illustrate this point. 
            The Arizona Department of Education could easily justify an oversight role for
charter schools. The legislative statute creating this agency speaks of a responsibility for
all public schools. However, without additional funds to hire charter school support
staff, ADE's role was effectively limited. Moreover, the charter statute asked little of the
Department beyond providing general support to the sponsoring boards on an as-needed
basis. Without clearly articulated statutory demands and funding to hire charter school
support staff, ADE was overwhelmed by these new responsibilities and unable to
institute any meaningful oversight on charter schools. 
            The Office of the Auditor General faced the same dilemma as ADE: they had
statutory responsibilities, but received no additional funding to carry out those duties.
The Office of the Auditor General was created to ensure that public entities were using
tax-payer dollars appropriately. Arizona Revised Statute §41-1279.03 requires this
office: "to be an independent source of impartial information concerning state and local
governmental entities and to provide specific recommendations to improve the
operations of those entities" (http://www .azleg.state.az.us/ars/41/1279). Accordingly,
this agency had responsibilities for conducting and reviewing financial audits of public
schools. Because charter schools are publicly funded, they came under the purview of
this agency. Similar to the Arizona Department of Education, the Office of the Auditor
General Office was not allocated additional funding to meet this charge. 
            One fundamental objective of the charter reform was to make sure that charter
schools were not caught up in the same bureaucratic rules and regulations as the district
public schools. Transferring authority to specially appointed bureaucratic agencies and
limiting funds to government agencies for administrative staff effectively achieved that
goal. 
            An equally important contextual factor ensured the original intentions embodied
in Arizona's charter school policy were intact during the state political to state
bureaucratic linkage. Lisa Graham-Keegan was the author of the charter legislation as
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Chair of the House Education Committee. The charter school legislation took effect in
September 1994, and she was elected to the position of State Superintendent of Public
Instruction in November 1994. 
            Wohlstetter (1991) argued that "success of educational reforms was tied directly
to the political agendas and self interests of their legislative sponsors or champions"
(p.289). Other legislators clearly recognized Graham-Keegan's self interest in the charter
school policy. "The Superintendent of Public Instruction is a strong proponent of charter
schools. As a matter of fact, I would say sometimes to the disadvantage of the non-
charter schools" (House Education Committee Member Kathy Foster, March 24, 1998). 
            The Superintendent of Public Instruction had a place on both the State Board of
Education and the State Board for Charter Schools. Observations of both boards
recorded over three years verified that Graham-Keegan used her position as expert on
these layperson-dominated boards to ensure that the legislative intent was preserved.
(Note 7) 
            Moreover, in her capacity as CEO of the Department of Education,
Graham-Keegan was able to make sure that her staff did not misconstrue the aims of the
policy. Although the legislature had transferred authority away from this agency and
withheld funding, Graham-Keegan took several additional steps. First, Keegan ran on a
platform of cutting the bureaucracy within ADE. One of her first actions after the
election was to initiate a major downsizing of staff at ADE. The year before she took
office the Department of Education had 460 full-time staff members. By 1996, she
reduced the number of full-time staff to 231 (personal communication, ADE Payroll
Division, April 1998). However, the Department was unable to function effectively with
such low staffing provisions, much to the concern of some Democratic legislators.
Well, for one thing they [ADE] could add a few more staff people and they
could keep them longer than six months. I don't think myself, I've called
over there and gotten the same person twice. There's no continuity of staff at
all." I think that speaks volumes of what's going on. (Senate Education
Committee Member Mary Hartley, March 23, 1998)
            However, legislators from the minority party were forgotten players in education
policy, and only after school district leaders began to vociferously complain about the
quality of services, did the numbers rise to 348 full-time staff by April 1998 (personal
communication, ADE Payroll Division, April 1998). Consequently, fewer staff had more
responsibilities, further limiting the possibility for bureaucratic oversight of charter
schools. Graham-Keegan took another explicit step in order to limit bureaucratic
interference from ADE. She discouraged effective communication among the various
divisions in the Department of Education. Her justification for this uncoordinated
approach was as follows:
Our main efforts are not to be to onerous on all schools. We don't have an
internal structure of people who just focus on charter school issues. We
have people from all departments dealing with the schools and don't isolate
it anyway. We have specialists who work in various areas in all public
schools. (Personal communication, Lisa Graham- Keegan, April 21, 1998)
            The practical result to this uncoordinated approach to charter school oversight
ensured that each unit within the Department had no idea what the other divisions were
doing and gave rise to the belief, reiterated in interviews with ADE staff, that
"somebody else must be looking at that." Keegan's position on the state sponsoring
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boards, a major staff reduction and persistent turnover, coupled with a lack of
coordinated leadership, disabled the bureaucratic response to charters. These contextual
factors, in addition to the explicit steps taken by legislators to transfer authority away
from state agencies and limit funding, allowed the original aims of the charter school
policy to remain intact during the state political to state bureaucratic linkage.
State Bureaucratic to Charter School Linkage 
            The final linkage in the charter school reform was from the state bureaucratic to
the charter school level. The institutional distrust between political leaders and state
level implementors was equally as strong among political leaders and local
implementors. Selecting a system changing policy instrument transferred authority away
from district administrators and teachers, much as it did with state level implementors.
Similar to creating the state boards and appointing handpicked individuals, local
implementors were recruited. Most of the charter school applicants participated in the
Goldwater Institute's charter school project. Mary Gifford, a staff member at the
Goldwater Institute during the early 1990s, said in a 1998 interview,
We were integral in getting that legislation through in the summer of 1994,
and then the Goldwater Institute launched a two-year charter school
program, a project at that time. The first year [we] aimed at getting the word
out on charter schools" setting up conferences, developing a how to apply
type of manual, [and] trying to get as many qualified applicants as possible
before the board so we could get charters up and running. (Mary Gifford,
March 9, 1998)
            Consequently, those at the school level were socialized early on as to the
intentions of state level policy makers. Some of the charter school directors were
formerly district teachers who were frustrated with the constraining rules, regulations,
and levels of bureaucracy. Others came from private industry and wanted to run their
school like a business. Whatever the rationale, virtually all of the charter school directors
attended the Goldwater seminars. Therefore, the individuals who were creating the
policy at the point of implementation understood the intentions of policy authors; they
would not have to endure the level of bureaucratic reporting as district public schools,
but they would be forced to attract and maintain their student population. More
importantly, individuals at the smallest unit had the capacity and will to implement these
principles (McLaughlin, 1998). In addition to transferring authority away from district
public school personnel and recruiting local implementors, the charter school policy also
removed one linkage in the policy process. Traditionally policy is interpreted at the state
department of education, the central district office, and finally it is passed along to
schools within the district. However, in a charter school, the district and school are one
in the same. Consequently, one potential linkage, where original aims could have been
misconstrued or subverted, was averted with the charter school policy. In sum, local
implementors were recruited, socialized and had the will to support the legislative intent.
Conclusion
            The distortion of intentions for Arizona's charter school policy when put into
practice was minimal, a finding at odds with most of the research on education (and
social policy) implementation. From the literature, it appears that four variables
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influence successful policy implementation: communication, financial support, will, and
bureaucratic structure (Edwards, 1980; McLaughlin, 1998; Weatherly & Lipsky, 1977).
Arizona policy makers addressed all four features, significantly increasing the chances
that the legislative intent, embodied in the charter school policy, would be preserved in
practice. 
            First key Arizona legislators effectively communicated their intentions to state
and local implementors. They did so by clearly articulating their intent to decrease the
bureaucratic structure in statute. Arizona Revised Statute (ARS) §150183E obligates
charter schools to comply with federal, state, and local rules, regulations, and statutes
relating to the health, safety, civil rights, and insurance. In addition, charter schools must
provide a non-sectarian, comprehensive curriculum and design a method to measure
pupil progress. With the exception of the aforementioned requirements, charter schools
are "exempt from all statutes and rules relating to schools, governing boards, and school
districts" (ARS §15-183E5). 
            This blanket waiver liberated charter schools from over 1000 pages of rules and
regulations by which district public schools must abide. Moreover, the specific
responsibilities for the Office of the Auditor General were omitted in the charter school
statute, and there was only a single vague reference to the role expectations for the
Arizona Department of Education. By explicitly excluding a clear description of the
responsibilities for state regulatory agencies, policy makers reinforced their message of
limited bureaucratic controls. Key legislators preserved their intent over the following
four years by defeating proposals that would limit competition or increase reporting
requirements for charter schools. Arizona policy makers were also acutely aware of the
impact financial support would have on implementation efforts. To limit excessive
bureaucratic oversight, they simply refused to appropriate funds for state level
bureaucrats. The administrative staff for the State Board for Charter Schools through
1998 consisted of an Executive Director and one administrative assistant . (Note 8) 
            The State Board of Education staff was also very lean. During the first two years
of the charter school program, the staff included an Executive Director and one
secretary; the same staffing provision as before the state board gained charter school
responsibilities. In November 1997, the SBE created a new position, Director of the
Charter School Division for the State Board of Education, who was given all
responsibilities for SBE sponsored charter schools. The simple yet effective strategy of
withholding funds for administrative staff also thwarted the efforts of the Arizona
Department of Education and the Office of the Auditor General to bureaucratically
monitor Arizona charter schools. The attitudes of individuals implementing policy were
a third critical influence, which affected successful implementation. Arizona policy
makers transferred authority away from state and local implementors who lacked the
"appropriate" attitude toward the charter school policy. Republican legislators
understood that many local implementors were hostile to the charter school idea. District
school administrators were threatened by the potential loss of students and funding.
District school teachers felt the charter schools were a way to deteriorate inroads made
by the teachers unions. Consequently, individuals from non-traditional backgrounds
(e.g., the military, health care, private schools and industry) were recruited to run the
public charter schools. 
            The same technique was used at the state level. The Department of Education
lost some of their authority when charter schools were granted a blanket waiver from the
rules, regulations, and reporting requirements established for district schools. This
authority was assumed by two "charter friendly" boards. The State Board of Education,
where all members were appointed by pro-school choice governors and the State Board
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for Charter Schools, where the main criteria for membership was a strong disposition
toward increasing school choice. Transferring authority to individuals who had a
favorable inclination towards the policy intent dramatically decreased the chance of
slippage. 
            Finally, organizational fragmentation at the Arizona Department of Education,
combined with minimal bureaucratic structure for the state level sponsoring boards
ensured that the policy intent was preserved in the working program. Lisa
Graham-Keegan, the author of the charter school bill, had an unusually large amount of
power over the implementation of the policy and proved to be a key actor in preserving
the original aims. In her capacity as Superintendent of Public Instruction,
Graham-Keegan had a seat on both state sponsoring boards and was able to influence the
behavior of board members who deferred to her judgment. Her position also allowed her
to constrain the actions of bureaucrats at the Arizona Department of Education. 
            The intent of the Arizona charter school policy was preserved through a series of
purposefully employed policy instruments and reinforced by a supportive contextual
environment. Policy makers created a system- changing reform, which successfully
transferred authority away from state and district level personnel, both of whom had
historically altered legislative intent. Hall (1995) stated, "Policy production is a very
complex process requiring much integration and coordination. It depends on the
collective activity of many actors.... There are many places for contingency and
numerous opportunities for altering the patterns of the past and context" (p.409).
Arizona policy makers were able to maximize the potential for the preservation of their
intentions by their explicit actions to produce a policy that limited bureaucratic oversight
and neutralized the influence of policy actors who traditionally play key roles in shaping
policy in practice.
Notes 
For a more thorough review of the implementation research see Elmore & Sykes,
1992; Fuhrman, Clune & Elmore, 1988; or McLaughlin, 1998).
1.
See also Kaufman 1972; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975; or Edwards, 1980 for a
further discussion on the character of implementors.
2.
These two state entities were responsible for approving new schools as well as
general oversight.
3.
For example, business leaders tend to favor the market-based nature of the reform.
Conversely, teacher organizations favor the reform because it provides teachers
with more autonomy.
4.
For example, amendments that would increase reporting requirements or restrict
the choices of customers would run counter to the spirit of the legislation.
5.
All of the members were appointed by pro school choice Republican Governors.
Although their position on this issue was not the main criterion for appointment,
as it was with the members serving on the SBCS.
6.
Although Keegan was never a professional educator, board members repeatedly
deferred to her judgment because of her position as Superintendent of Public
Instruction.
7.
The SBCS had five Executive Directors in the first three years of the charter
school program.
8.
References
14 of 18
Barrow, S. (1978). Federal education goals and policy instruments: An assessment of the
strings attached to categorical grants in education. In M. Timpane (Ed.), The Federal 
Interest in Financing Schools. Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation.
Baum, L. (1984). Legislatures, courts, and the dispositions of policy implementors. In G.
C. Edwards III (Ed.), Public Policy Implementation (pp. 29-57). Greenwich, CN: JAI
Press..
Baum, L. (1981). Comparing the implementation of legislative and judicial policies. In
D. A. Mazmanian & P. A. Sabatier (Eds.), Effective Policy Implementation (pp. 39-62).
Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
Berman, P., & McLaughlin, M. W. (1978). Federal programs supporting educational
change: Vol. VIII. Implementing and sustaining innovations. Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation.
Bomotti, S., Ginsberg, R. and Cobb, B. (1999). Teachers in Charter Schools and
Traditional Schools: A Comparative Study. Education Policy Analysis Archives, 7, , 22 
(Entire issue). Available online at http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v7n22.html
Clinton, B. (1997). Public school choice and accountability in education. President
Clinton's call to action for American education in the 21st century,
http://www.ed.gov/updates/PresEDPlan/part6.html.
Clune, W. H. (1987). Institutional choice as a theoretical framework for research on
educational policy. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 9(2), 117-132.
Edwards, G. C. III. (1980). Implementing public policy. Washington, DC: Congressional
Quarterly Press.
Elmore, R. & Sykes, G. (1992). Curriculum policy. In P. Jackson (Ed.), Handbook of 
Research on Curriculum (pp.185-215). New York: Macmillan.
Elmore, R. F., & McLaughlin, M. W. (1981). Rethinking the federal role in education.
Washington, DC: US Department of Education.
Furhman, S. H., Clune, W., & Elmore, R. (1988). Research on education reform:
Lessons on the implementation of policy. Teachers College Record, 90(2), 237-258.
Garn, G. (1998). The thinking behind Arizona's charter school movement. Educational 
Leadership, 56(2), 48-50.
Garn, G., & Stout, R. T. (In press). How a good theory failed in practice. In R. Maranto,
S. Milliman, F. Hess, and A. Gresham (Eds.), School Choice in the Real World: Lessons
from Arizona Charter Schools. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Gold, R. L. (1969). Roles in sociological field observation. In G. McCall & J. L.
Simmons (Eds.), Issues in participant observation (pp. 30-39). Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley.
Hall, P. M. (1995). The consequences of qualitative analysis for sociological theory:
15 of 18
Beyond the microlevel. The Sociological Quarterly, 36(2), 397-423.
Hall, P. M., & McGinty, J. W. (1997). Policy as the transformation of intentions:
Producing program from statute. The Sociological Quarterly, 38(3), 439-467.
Kaufman, H. (1973). Administrative feedback: Monitoring subordinates behavior.
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
Knapp, M. S. (1997). Between systemic reforms and the mathematics and science
classroom: The dynamics of innovation, implementation, and professional learning.
Review of Educational Research, 67(2), 227-266.
Lipsky, M. (1980). Street-level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public
services. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Mattern, H. (1994, October 4). It's not much now. It's humble, but that will change:
Phoenix site will give rise to one of state's 1st charter schools. The Arizona Republic, p. 
A1.
McDonnell, L. M., & Elmore, R. F. (1987). Getting the job done: Alternative policy
instruments. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 9(2), 133-152.
Mclaughlin, M. W. (1998). Listening and learning from the field: Tales of policy
implementation and situated practice. In A. Hargraves, A. Lieberman, M. Fullan, & D.
Hopkins (Eds.), International Handbook of Educational Change (Part One). Boston,
MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Miles, M. B., & Huberman, A. M. (1994). An expanded sourcebook: Qualitative data 
analysis (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.
Nathan, J. (1996). Charter schools: Creating hope and opportunity for American
education. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers.
Odden, A. R. (1991). The evolution of education policy implementation. In A.R. Odden
(Ed.), Education Policy Implementation (pp. 1-12). Albany, NY: State University of
New York Press.
Pressman, J., & Wildavsky, A. (1973). How great expectations in Washington are
dashed in Oakland, or why it's amazing that federal programs work at all. Berkeley,
CA: University of California.
Stake, R. E. (1995). The art of case study research. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE 
Publications.
Van Meter, D. S., & Van Horn, C. E. (1975). The policy implementation process: A
conceptual framework. Administration and Society, 6, 445-488.
Weatherly, R., & Lipsky, M. (1977). Street level bureaucrats and institutional
innovation: Implementing special education reform. Harvard Educational Review,
47(2), 171-197.
Weick, K. E. (1982). Administering education in loosely coupled schools. Phi Delta 
16 of 18
Kappan, 63(10), 673-676.
Wohlstetter, P. (1991). Legislative oversight of education policy implementation. In
Odden, A. R. (Ed.), Education Policy Implementation (pp. 279-295). Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press.
Wohlstetter, P., & Griffin, N. C. (1997, March). Creating and sustaining learning 
communities: Early lessons from charter schools. Paper presented at the annual meeting
of the American Educational Research Association, Chicago, IL.
Wohlstetter, P., Wenning, R., & Briggs, K. (1995). Charter schools in the United States:
The question of autonomy. Educational Policy, 9(4), 331-358.
Yin, R. K. (1994). Case study research: Design and methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
SAGE Publications.
About the Author
Gregg A. Garn 
The University of Oklahoma
Educational Leadership & Policy Studies
820 Van Vleet Oval 
Norman. OK 73019-2041
Email: garn@ou.edu
B.A. University of Northern Iowa, 1994
M.S. Arizona State University, 1996
Ph.D. Arizona State University, 1998
Gregg Garn is an Assistant Professor of Educational Leadership and Policy Studies at
the University of Oklahoma where he teaches courses in politics and policy. His research
interests include school choice, policy development and implementation, and the politics
of education.
Copyright 1999 by the Education Policy Analysis Archives
The World Wide Web address for the Education Policy Analysis Archives is 
http://epaa.asu.edu
General questions about appropriateness of topics or particular articles may be addressed to
the Editor, Gene V Glass, glass@asu.edu or reach him at College of Education, Arizona
State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-0211. (602-965-9644). The Book Review Editor is
Walter E. Shepherd: shepherd@asu.edu . The Commentary Editor is Casey D. Cobb:
casey.cobb@unh.edu .
EPAA Editorial Board
17 of 18
Michael W. Apple
University of Wisconsin
Greg Camilli
Rutgers University
John Covaleskie
Northern Michigan University
Andrew Coulson
a_coulson@msn.com
Alan Davis 
University of Colorado, Denver
Sherman Dorn
University of South Florida
Mark E. Fetler
California Commission on Teacher Credentialing
Richard Garlikov
hmwkhelp@scott.net
Thomas F. Green
Syracuse University
Alison I. Griffith
York University
Arlen Gullickson
Western Michigan University
Ernest R. House
University of Colorado
Aimee Howley
Ohio University
Craig B. Howley
Appalachia Educational Laboratory
William Hunter
University of Calgary
Richard M. Jaeger
University of North Carolina—
Greensboro
Daniel Kallós
Umeå University
Benjamin Levin
University of Manitoba
Thomas Mauhs- Pugh
Green Mountain College
Dewayne Matthews
Western Interstate Commission for Higher
Education
William McInerney
Purdue University
Mary McKeown-Moak
MGT of America (Austin, TX)
Les McLean
University of Toronto
Susan Bobbitt Nolen
University of Washington
Anne L. Pemberton
apembert@pen.k12.va.us
Hugh G. Petrie
SUNY Buffalo
Richard C. Richardson
New York University
Anthony G. Rud Jr.
Purdue University
Dennis Sayers
Ann Leavenworth Center
for Accelerated Learning
Jay D. Scribner
University of Texas at Austin
Michael Scriven
scriven@aol.com
Robert E. Stake 
University of Illinois—UC
Robert Stonehill
U.S. Department of Education
Robert T. Stout
Arizona State University
David D. Williams
Brigham Young University  
EPAA Spanish Language Editorial Board
Associate Editor for Spanish Language
Roberto Rodríguez Gómez 
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
18 of 18
roberto@servidor.unam.mx 
Adrián Acosta (México)
Universidad de Guadalajara
adrianacosta@compuserve.com
J. Félix Angulo Rasco (Spain)
Universidad de Cádiz
felix.angulo@uca.es
Teresa Bracho (México)
Centro de Investigación y Docencia
Económica-CIDE
bracho dis1.cide.mx
Alejandro Canales (México) 
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de
México
canalesa@servidor.unam.mx
Ursula Casanova (U.S.A.)
Arizona State University
casanova@asu.edu
José Contreras Domingo
Universitat de Barcelona 
Jose.Contreras@doe.d5.ub.es
Erwin Epstein (U.S.A.)
Loyola University of Chicago
Eepstein@luc.edu
Josué González (U.S.A.)
Arizona State University
josue@asu.edu
Rollin Kent (México)
Departamento de Investigación
Educativa- DIE/CINVESTAV
rkent@gemtel.com.mx      
kentr@data.net.mx
María Beatriz Luce (Brazil)
Universidad Federal de Rio Grande do 
Sul- UFRGS
lucemb@orion.ufrgs.br
Javier Mendoza Rojas (México)
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de
México
javiermr@servidor.unam.mx
Marcela Mollis (Argentina)
Universidad de Buenos Aires
mmollis@filo.uba.ar
Humberto Muñoz García (México)
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de
México
humberto@servidor.unam.mx
Angel Ignacio Pérez Gómez (Spain)
Universidad de Málaga
aiperez@uma.es
Daniel Schugurensky
(Argentina-Canadá)
OISE/UT, Canada
dschugurensky@oise.utoronto.ca
Simon Schwartzman (Brazil)
Fundação Instituto Brasileiro e Geografia
e Estatística 
simon@openlink.com.br 
Jurjo Torres Santomé (Spain)
Universidad de A Coruña
jurjo@udc.es
Carlos Alberto Torres (U.S.A.)
University of California, Los Angeles
torres@gseisucla.edu
